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Transgender Rights and the Missouri Human Rights Act: An Overview
of R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District
By Michael Scott*
On February 29, 2019, the Missouri Supreme Court issued a landmark
decision concerning transgender rights in R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV
School District.1 The Court held that a transgender student pled sufficient
facts to survive a motion to dismiss when he alleged his school district
discriminated against him on the grounds of his sex.2 The petitioner,
R.M.A., alleged that the school had denied him access to public
accommodations—the boys’ restrooms and locker rooms—in violation of
Section 231.065 of the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”).3 R.M.A. is
the first case in which the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized that
transgender individuals are protected by the MHRA.
At the time of the initial lawsuit, R.M.A. attended high school in the Blue
Springs R-IV School District (“Blue Springs”).4 Blue Springs, located near
Kansas City, Missouri, serves a student population of nearly 15,000.5 R.M.A.
began his transition in 2009; a year later, he legally changed his name to
reflect his gender identity.6 In 2014, R.M.A. changed his gender marker
from female to male on his birth certificate.7 Throughout this process,
R.M.A. and his parents notified Blue Springs of his transition, name change,
and gender change in hopes that the district would accommodate him.8
Blue Springs allowed R.M.A. to participate in boys’ physical education
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1 R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-VI Sch. Dist., Mo. No. SC96683, 2019 Mo. LEXIS 54 (Mo. Feb.
26, 2019).
2 Id. at *3, *5, *11.
3 Id. at *2–3.
4 R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-VI Sch. Dist., WD 80005, 2017 WL 3026757, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App.
W.D., July 18, 2017).
5 About the District, The Blue Springs School District,
https://www.bssd.net/cms/lib/MO01910299/Centricity/
Domain/3368/HRbrochureWEB.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
6 R.M.A., 2017 WL 3026757 at *2.
7 Substitute Brief of Respondents/Defendants at 7, R.M.A. ex rel. Rachelle Appleberry v.
Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist. (Mo. No. SC96683).
8 R.M.A., 2017 WL 3026757 at *3.
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classes and boys’ sports programs in accordance with his gender identity.9
However, the district forced R.M.A. to dress for sports activities in a
separate, unisex bathroom outside of the boys’ locker room10 and, during
the 2013–14 school year, the district did not allow R.M.A. to use the boys’
locker rooms nor the boys’ restrooms at his high school.11
In assessing R.M.A.’s claim of discrimination, the Court analyzed MHRA
section 213.065.2, which states:
It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, directly or
indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person . . .
advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available in any place of
public accommodation . . . or to segregate or discriminate against any such
person in the use thereof on the grounds of . . . sex.12
In effect, R.M.A. had to allege facts in his claim supporting four elements to
survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss: (1) that the defendants denied
him “full and equal use and enjoyment” of a public accommodation; (2) that
he is part of a protected class; (3) that his sex was a contributing or
motivating factor in the denial of his use of a public accommodation; and
(4) that he suffered damages.13
The Court held that R.M.A. had alleged facts sufficient for each element of
his claim.14 First, the Court stated that the school’s locker rooms and
restrooms were public accommodations and R.M.A. had been denied access
to them.15 Second, R.M.A. alleged that he was male, as shown on his
amended birth certificate, and thus is a member of a protected class.16 Sex
is a protected class under Section 213.065 of the MHRA, and his amended
Id. at *2.
Substitute Brief of Respondents/Defendants, supra note 6, at 7–8. The school district
admits that “[o]ther boys attending school within the . . . School District ha[d] regular,
unrestricted access to the boys’ locker rooms and restrooms in schools operated” by the
district. Id. at 7.
11 R.M.A., 2017 WL 3026757 at *2.
12 R.M.A, 2019 Mo. LEXIS 54 at *5.
13 Id. at *7–10.
14 Id. at *11.
15 Id. at *8.
16 Id. at *8–9.
9

10
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birth certificate sufficiently established R.M.A.’s legal sex as male for the
pleading stage.17 Third, the pleadings stated that R.M.A. was discriminated
against because of his sex since he received “different and inferior access to
public facilities” and that his sex was a contributing factor in the school
district’s behavior.18 Lastly, R.M.A. alleged that he had suffered damages
because of the defendants’ discrimination.19
The lynchpin of the Court’s decision was a recognition that the MHRA does
not prohibit discrimination only on the basis of biological sex, which was a
statutory interpretation advanced by the dissenting justices. 20 The majority
argued that the dissenting justices, by restricting the scope of the MHRA to
biological sex, were reading a requirement into the MHRA that is not part
of the text of the statute.21 The Court recognized that a person’s sex may
change throughout his or her life and it may be different from the person’s
sex at his or her birth.22 Interestingly, in so ruling, the majority did not rely
on a “sexual stereotyping” theory articulated in Title VII cases that has been
used to protect transgender individuals.23 The Court recognized that, as
shown on his amended birth certificate, R.M.A.’s legal sex was male and his
Id. at *5, *8–9.
R.M.A, 2019 Mo. LEXIS 54 at *9.
19 Id.
20 Id. at *9 n.8.
21 Id. at *9 n.7. In their argument, the dissenting justices relied upon Pittman v. Cook Paper
Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015), which stated that the “clear
meaning” of “discrimination because of . . . sex” in the MHRA refers only to
discrimination against one as a male or female. Id. at *18. Therefore, the dissenters
asserted that the MHRA, read in the light of the appellate court’s decision in Pittman,
does not protect transgender individuals. Id. at *17–18. In addition to disagreeing with
the dissenters’ interpretation of the MHRA, the majority opinion
distinguished Pittman and the federal Title VII cases cited by the dissent by stating these
cases illustrated only that one cannot state a claim of discrimination based on sexual
orientation or transgender status. Id. at *9 n.9. Here, R.M.A. alleged he was discriminated
against because of his sex. Id.
22 Id. at *9 n.7.
23 Id. at *6 n.4. For example, the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem held that Title VII
provides protections for transgender people because it prohibits discrimination based on
gender stereotypes. 378 F.3d 566, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2004). Here, the majority stated that
while the MHRA does not provide for types of sexual discrimination claims, sex
stereotyping can be used as evidence of sex discrimination. R.M.A, 2019 Mo. LEXIS 54 at
*6 n.4. The majority stated that while the MHRA does not provide for types of sexual
discrimination claims, sex stereotyping can be used as evidence of sex discrimination. Id.
17
18
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discrimination claim would be measured against the
accommodations provided to other males in his school district. 24

public

This case represents a fundamental leap forward for Missouri’s transgender
citizens since they can now successfully state claims of discrimination
under the MHRA. LGBT activists have been working, unsuccessfully, to
incorporate protections from discrimination against sexual orientation and
gender identity legislatively into the MHRA since 1998.25 Even though there
is much work left to be done to protect transgender individuals from
discrimination, their future is looking brighter in Missouri.
Edited by Carter Gage

R.M.A, 2019 Mo. LEXIS 54 at *6, *9 n.7.
Ellen Herrion, Note, What’s Missing? Addressing the Inadequate LGBT Protections in the
Missouri Human Rights Act, 81 Mo. L. Rev. 1173, 1178 (2016).
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